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Documents authored by Nanashima, Mikito

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.70
Learning Versus Pseudorandom Generators in Constant Parallel Time

Authors: Shuichi Hirahara and Mikito Nanashima

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 251, 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)

Abstract
A polynomial-stretch pseudorandom generator (PPRG) in NC⁰ (i.e., constant parallel time) is one of the most important cryptographic primitives, especially for constructing highly efficient cryptography and indistinguishability obfuscation. The celebrated work (Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz, SIAM Journal on Computing, 2006) on randomized encodings yields the characterization of sublinear-stretch pseudorandom generators in NC⁰ by the existence of logspace-computable one-way functions, but characterizing PPRGs in NC⁰ seems out of reach at present. Therefore, it is natural to ask which sort of hardness notion is essential for constructing PPRGs in NC⁰. Particularly, to the best of our knowledge, all the previously known candidates for PPRGs in NC⁰ follow only one framework based on Goldreich’s one-way function. In this paper, we present a new learning-theoretic characterization for PPRGs in NC⁰ and related classes. Specifically, we consider the average-case hardness of learning for well-studied classes in parameterized settings, where the number of samples is restricted to fixed-parameter tractable (FPT), and show that the following are equivalent: - The existence of (a collection of) PPRGs in NC⁰. - The average-case hardness of learning sparse 𝔽₂-polynomials on a sparse example distribution and an NC⁰-samplable target distribution (i.e., a distribution on target functions). - The average-case hardness of learning Fourier-sparse functions on a sparse example distribution and an NC⁰-samplable target distribution. - The average-case hardness of learning constant-depth parity decision trees on a sparse example distribution and an NC⁰-samplable target distribution. Furthermore, we characterize a (single) PPRG in parity-NC⁰ by the average-case hardness of learning constant-degree 𝔽₂-polynomials on a uniform example distribution with FPT samples. Based on our results, we propose new candidates for PPRGs in NC⁰ and related classes under a hardness assumption on a natural learning problem. An important property of PPRGs in NC⁰ constructed in our framework is that the output bits are computed by various predicates; thus, it seems to resist an attack that depends on a specific property of one fixed predicate. Conceptually, the main contribution of this study is to formalize a theory of FPT dualization of concept classes, which yields a meta-theorem for the first result. For the second result on PPRGs in parity-NC⁰, we use a different technique of pseudorandom 𝔽₂-polynomials.
Cite as

Shuichi Hirahara and Mikito Nanashima. Learning Versus Pseudorandom Generators in Constant Parallel Time. In 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 251, pp. 70:1-70:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{hirahara_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.70,
  author =	{Hirahara, Shuichi and Nanashima, Mikito},
  title =	{{Learning Versus Pseudorandom Generators in Constant Parallel Time}},
  booktitle =	{14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)},
  pages =	{70:1--70:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-263-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{251},
  editor =	{Tauman Kalai, Yael},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.70},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-175736},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.70},
  annote =	{Keywords: Parallel cryptography, polynomial-stretch pseudorandom generators in NC⁰, PAC learning, average-case complexity, fixed-parameter tractability}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CCC.2022.25
Finding Errorless Pessiland in Error-Prone Heuristica

Authors: Shuichi Hirahara and Mikito Nanashima

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 234, 37th Computational Complexity Conference (CCC 2022)

Abstract
Average-case complexity has two standard formulations, i.e., errorless complexity and error-prone complexity. In average-case complexity, a critical topic of research is to show the equivalence between these formulations, especially on the average-case complexity of NP. In this study, we present a relativization barrier for such an equivalence. Specifically, we construct an oracle relative to which NP is easy on average in the error-prone setting (i.e., DistNP ⊆ HeurP) but hard on average in the errorless setting even by 2^o(n/log n)-size circuits (i.e., DistNP ⊈ AvgSIZE[2^o(n/log n)]), which provides an answer to the open question posed by Impagliazzo (CCC 2011). Additionally, we show the following in the same relativized world: - Lower bound of meta-complexity: GapMINKT^𝒪 ∉ prSIZE^𝒪[2^o(n/log n)] and GapMCSP^𝒪 ∉ prSIZE^𝒪[2^(n^ε)] for some ε > 0. - Worst-case hardness of learning on uniform distributions: P/poly is not weakly PAC learnable with membership queries on the uniform distribution by nonuniform 2ⁿ/n^ω(1)-time algorithms. - Average-case hardness of distribution-free learning: P/poly is not weakly PAC learnable on average by nonuniform 2^o(n/log n)-time algorithms. - Weak cryptographic primitives: There exist a hitting set generator, an auxiliary-input one-way function, an auxiliary-input pseudorandom generator, and an auxiliary-input pseudorandom function against SIZE^𝒪[2^o(n/log n)]. This provides considerable insights into Pessiland (i.e., the world in which no one-way function exists, and NP is hard on average), such as the relativized separation of the error-prone average-case hardness of NP and auxiliary-input cryptography. At the core of our oracle construction is a new notion of random restriction with masks.
Cite as

Shuichi Hirahara and Mikito Nanashima. Finding Errorless Pessiland in Error-Prone Heuristica. In 37th Computational Complexity Conference (CCC 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 234, pp. 25:1-25:28, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{hirahara_et_al:LIPIcs.CCC.2022.25,
  author =	{Hirahara, Shuichi and Nanashima, Mikito},
  title =	{{Finding Errorless Pessiland in Error-Prone Heuristica}},
  booktitle =	{37th Computational Complexity Conference (CCC 2022)},
  pages =	{25:1--25:28},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-241-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{234},
  editor =	{Lovett, Shachar},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CCC.2022.25},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-165875},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CCC.2022.25},
  annote =	{Keywords: average-case complexity, oracle separation, relativization barrier, meta-complexity, learning, auxiliary-input cryptography}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.29
On Basing Auxiliary-Input Cryptography on NP-Hardness via Nonadaptive Black-Box Reductions

Authors: Mikito Nanashima

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 185, 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021)

Abstract
Constructing one-way functions based on NP-hardness is a central challenge in theoretical computer science. Unfortunately, Akavia et al. [Akavia et al., 2006] presented strong evidence that a nonadaptive black-box (BB) reduction is insufficient to solve this challenge. However, should we give up such a central proof technique even for an intermediate step? In this paper, we turn our eyes from standard cryptographic primitives to weaker cryptographic primitives allowed to take auxiliary-input and continue to explore the capability of nonadaptive BB reductions to base auxiliary-input primitives on NP-hardness. Specifically, we prove the followings: - if we base an auxiliary-input pseudorandom generator (AIPRG) on NP-hardness via a nonadaptive BB reduction, then the polynomial hierarchy collapses; - if we base an auxiliary-input one-way function (AIOWF) or auxiliary-input hitting set generator (AIHSG) on NP-hardness via a nonadaptive BB reduction, then an (i.o.-)one-way function also exists based on NP-hardness (via an adaptive BB reduction). These theorems extend our knowledge on nonadaptive BB reductions out of the current worst-to-average framework. The first result provides new evidence that nonadaptive BB reductions are insufficient to base AIPRG on NP-hardness. The second result also yields a weaker but still surprising consequence of nonadaptive BB reductions, i.e., a one-way function based on NP-hardness. In fact, the second result is interpreted in the following two opposite ways. Pessimistically, it shows that basing AIOWF or AIHSG on NP-hardness via nonadaptive BB reductions is harder than constructing a one-way function based on NP-hardness, which can be regarded as a negative result. Note that AIHSG is a weak primitive implied even by the hardness of learning; thus, this pessimistic view provides conceptually stronger limitations than the currently known limitations on nonadaptive BB reductions. Optimistically, it offers a new hope: breakthrough construction of auxiliary-input primitives might also provide construction standard cryptographic primitives. This optimistic view enhances the significance of further investigation on constructing auxiliary-input or other intermediate cryptographic primitives instead of standard cryptographic primitives.
Cite as

Mikito Nanashima. On Basing Auxiliary-Input Cryptography on NP-Hardness via Nonadaptive Black-Box Reductions. In 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 185, pp. 29:1-29:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{nanashima:LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.29,
  author =	{Nanashima, Mikito},
  title =	{{On Basing Auxiliary-Input Cryptography on NP-Hardness via Nonadaptive Black-Box Reductions}},
  booktitle =	{12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021)},
  pages =	{29:1--29:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-177-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{185},
  editor =	{Lee, James R.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.29},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-135686},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.29},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auxiliary-input cryptographic primitives, nonadaptive black-box reductions}
}
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